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ALD-245

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-1372
___________
IN RE: JULIE P. WHITCHURCH,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to D.C. Civil No. 2:15-cv-00431)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
May 5, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 9, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________

PER CURIAM
Petitioner Julie Whitchurch, proceeding pro se, has filed her second petition for
writ of mandamus, seeking the recusal of the District Judge presiding over the case. For
the reasons set forth below, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Whitchurch was a co-defendant in a civil action brought by her former employer
Vizant Technologies, LLC (“Vizant”), and its chief executive officer, Joseph Bizzarro, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before the
Honorable Harvey Bartle III. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of contract,
misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, tortious interference with existing and
prospective contractual relationships, abuse of process, conversion, fraud, and civil
conspiracy against Whitchurch and Jamie Davis, a fellow former employee of Vizant.
After extensive litigation, Whitchurch and Davis filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455
seeking the recusal of Judge Bartle. He denied the motion for recusal. Whitchurch and
Davis then filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that recusal was warranted
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1) because the District Judge expressed extreme
prejudice and bias against them and engaged in allegedly improper ex parte
communications. We denied that petition, see In re Whitchurch, C.A. No. 16-1005, 2016
WL 211605 (3d Cir. Jan. 19, 2016) (per curiam), and Whitchurch’s subsequent petition
for en banc and panel rehearing.
While the first mandamus petition was pending before this Court, the District
Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment; granted in part and denied in part Whitchurch and Davis’s motion for
summary judgment; issued a permanent injunction against Whitchurch and Davis; and
required Whitchurch and Davis to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
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for a violation of a District Court order. The District Court then scheduled trial to
commence on March 2, 2016, on the sole remaining issue of damages.
On March 1, 2016, Whitchurch 1 filed her second petition for writ of mandamus. 2
Whitchurch once again seeks the recusal of Judge Bartle and incorporates by reference
the arguments that we already rejected in denying her first mandamus petition in C.A.
No. 16-1005.3 At the time she filed this petition, the civil case was still pending against
Whitchurch in the District Court. However, the record reflects that, subsequent to the
filing of Whitchurch’s second petition for writ of mandamus, the District Court entered
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Whitchurch. Whitchurch’s appeal of that
judgment, as well as multiple additional orders of the District Court, is currently pending
in this Court. See C.A. No. 16-1178.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S.
394, 402 (1976). Within the discretion of the issuing court, mandamus traditionally may
be “used . . . only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’” Id.
(citations omitted). To obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other

Davis is not a party to the petition. The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to
voluntarily dismiss the remaining claims against Davis pursuant to a settlement
agreement between the plaintiffs and Davis.
1

2

Included in her petition for a writ of mandamus was a motion to stay a March 1, 2016
settlement conference; a March 1, 2016 contempt hearing; and the March 2, 2016 trial for
damages. We denied the motion to stay in an order entered on February 29, 2016.
In this action, she also presents a “notice” for reconsideration of the arguments that she
raised previously, and she seeks leave to file an exhibit in support of her notice.
3

3

adequate means exist to attain the relief [s]he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of
the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). A writ of mandamus should not issue where relief
may be obtained through ordinary appeal. In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 226
(3d Cir. 1998).
We will deny the petition because Whitchurch has not shown a clear and
indisputable right to relief, and she is not without alternative recourse. Essentially,
Whitchurch seeks to challenge the orders against her through claims of fraud on the court
and alleged improper actions by the District Judge, including demonstrations of purported
bias and prejudice and ex parte communications. To the extent she relies on and
incorporates by reference the arguments made in her first mandamus petition, we reject
them for the reasons outlined in our opinion denying that petition. See In re Whitchurch,
2016 WL 211605, at *1-2. Furthermore, the District Court has entered a final appealable
order, and Whitchurch is currently appealing 28 orders of the District Court, which
involve rulings related to discovery, injunctive relief, summary judgment, and damages.
See C.A. No. 16-1178. Whitchurch can present her argument for recusal, including her
claims of fraud on the court, in that action. 4 Because her claims can be presented in her
direct appeal, mandamus relief is not available. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212-13
(3d Cir. 2006).

4

We express no opinion on the merits of the District Court’s rulings.
4

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Whitchurch’s “motion for leave to file Exhibit B” is granted.
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